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Abstract
The ‘conventional wisdom’ about eﬃcient markets is that there are
little excess returns, relative to the market returns (and the level of
risk) that one can make by analysing historical data. But researchers
have gathered systematic evidence about markets violating this con-
ventional wisdom. Some of these are calender eﬀects, small-ﬁrm or size
eﬀect etc. This paper examines a calender eﬀect known as ‘the-month-
of-the-year-eﬀect’ and examine whether this much-hyped anomaly is a
persisting feature in the Indian market. The paper shows that the pre-
vious evidence on seasonality could be the result of the very nature
of parametric methods, that it gets inﬂuenced by extreme observa-
tions. Otherwise, seasonality is not a feature of the current Indian
stock markets.
1 Market Anomalies: A Discussion
It is possible that if the data is torchured with suﬃcient intensity, one might
ﬁnd systematic patterns and apparent relations that he is looking for (Sul-
livan et al., 1998)! So if one is keen on discovering an anomaly in the stock
market to earn a quick buck, he just might discover unusual patterns emerg-
ing out of the most unusual of occurances. For instance investopedia 1 cir-
culated among its subscribers a list of what they called the ‘world’s wackiest
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indicators’. Though much of this had no logic. Nertheless it continue to
have an embarrassingly large number of believers. For example, multiplying
the change in the butter production in Bangladesh by two will give the per-
centage by which S&P 500 Index will change the next year. Or “When the
majority of a country dislikes the man in the White House, the stock market
is supposed to soar.”
Leaving these embarrassments apart, there has been scientiﬁc economic
evidence countering market eﬃciency. One of the earliest relates to the Cap-
ital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) speciﬁcation. It was shown that value
based measure have higher explanatory power than the beta (Basu, 1977)2.
This result was later conﬁrmed by Reinganum (1981). They found US stock
returns to be positively related with price to earnings ratios. Later, others
documented similar relation with Book–to–price ratio and dividend yields3.
Later Banz (1981) showed that in the US stock markets there is a negative
relation between security returns and the market value of the ﬁrm. This
anomaly is popularly known as the size eﬀect. All these evidences led to
the understanding towards a better multi–factor asset pricing models such
as the popular Fama–French three–factor model (Fama and French, 1992)4.
Coming back to anomalies, Shiller (1981) showed that prices wander away
from fundamental values since the variation in stock prices are too large to
be explained by variation in dividend payments5. Coming to long–horizon
returns, DeBondt and Thaler (1985) ﬁnds that stocks which underperformed
over a period of 3 to 5 years average the highest market–adjusted return over
the subsequent period. This long-term mis-pricing is seen as an overreaction
in the market in which stocks diverge from fundamental value.
Literature also abounds with stock market seasonalites. Documented
seasonalities include month-of-the-year, week-of-the-month, day-of-the-week
and hour-of-the-day eﬀects. Rozeﬀ and Kinney (1976) ﬁrst documented that
average stock returns in January are higher than any other month. Keim
2CAPM can be speciﬁed as:
푟푗 = 푎0 + 푎1훽푗 +
∑
푎푗퐶푖푗 + 푒푗 (1)
Where,푟푗 = Cross sectional returns of security j; 훽푗 = Covariance with the market return;
퐶푖푗 = Security speciﬁc characteristics. CAPM predicts that the 푎푗 is zero ∀푗 > 1
3The relation with dividen–yield could be due to the diﬀerential taxation of capital
gains and ordinary income. See Litzenberg and Ramaswamy (1979)
4Fama and French suggest that the additional variables proxy risk factors omitted from
CAPM
5“Measures of stock price volatility over the past century appear to be far too high –
ﬁve to thirteen times too high – to be attributed to new information about future real
dividends” (Shiller, 1981)
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(1983) and others6 also ﬁnds the same, that the ﬁfty percent of the annual
price premium in the US is concentrated in the month of January, particu-
larly in the ﬁrst few weeks of the year. This is particularly true for small ﬁrm
stocks. One explanation attributed to this behavior is the year end related
tax selling and the subsequent repurchases in January. By selling stocks that
have reduced in prices, particularly smallcap stocks, traders realize a capital
loss which can be used to oﬀset capital gains, thus reducing the taxable in-
come. This is popularly known as the tax loss selling hypothesis. Another
explanation relates to the portfolio rebalancing by institutional investors.
The fund mangers sell small stocks showing losses in the current year and
reinvest the funds in selected stocks in early January. The motivation for
this is that it will make their annual reports look stronger leading to higher
compensation for the manager 7. Ogden (1990) gives a diﬀerent explanation
for the monthly and January eﬀects. He attribute it, in part, due to the stan-
dardization in the payments system (in US). The cash ﬂows is concentrated
at the turn of each calendar month. Due to this standardization, investors
realize substantial cash receipts at the turn of the month and year. Which,
when reinvested leads to a surge in stock returns at the turn of the month.
He calls it, the ‘Turn of the month liquidity hypothesis’, since it depends
on the magnitude of aggregate liquid proﬁts realized in the month, which is
aﬀected by monetary policy. Since the turn of each month is a typical pay
oﬀ date, short–term investable funds prefer securities maturing at the end of
the calender month to securities maturing either before or after that date 8.
This demand for month end securities causes their prices (yields) to be bid
up (down) relative to adjacent maturity securities. In explaining the January
Eﬀect he says that his hypothesis is consistent with observed concentration
of positive returns in the ﬁrst few trading days of January. Besides, there
is a surge in retail activity at the end of the year (holiday eﬀect) and the
consequent liquid proﬁts in December is expected to induce a large surge in
stock returns in early January.
A recent paper by Pandey (2002) which examined the Bombay Stock
Exchange’s benchmark index ‘Sensex’ for the period 1991 to 2002 conﬁrm
the existence of seasonality and the January eﬀect in the Indian market. He
examines seasonality using an augmented dummy variable regression, taking
January as the omitted category or benchmark category in the model and
6Roll (1983), Reinganum (1983), Ritter (1988)
7See Ogden (1990)
8If it is in shorter term securities, it may have to be rolled over to provide the necessary
liquidity to pay turn of the month obligations. Or if it is in longer term securities it will
have to be sold prematurely. Either ways it is suboptimal due to the high interest rate
risk and transaction cost invloved.
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Figure 1: Mean Monthly Returns
replacing the residuals with an ARIMA model.
But, one feature of ﬁnancial anomalies is that they tend to disappear soon
after evidence of their existence enters the public domain (Bailey, 2005). This
is because either they signal proﬁtable investment opportunities which disap-
pear when they become widely known, or because they were never genuine9.
Here we examine whether the seasonality in monthly returns is a persisting
phenomenon in the Indian markets .
2 Seasonality in Nifty: An Exploration
A bar-graph of the mean across the months provides an easy visual explana-
tion of the prevalence of seasonality. Figure 1 is such a bar chart on mean
daily returns on Nifty for the period January 1991 to Ocotber 2008 for var-
ious months. From the bar-graph we can see that the calender months of
February and December has the highest mean daily returns, over and above
0.2%. The month of October register the lowest mean daily return of about
-0.14%. The calender months of March, April and May are the only other
months reporting negative mean daily returns.
The probability of having negative mean daily returns in each month is
computed in table 1. We deﬁne the probability of having negative returns
simply as the ratio of the frequency of a given month having mean negative
returns for the period 1991 to 2008 to the total frequency possible. From this
we can see that the calender months of March and April have the highest
probability (72% and 67%, respectively), while the December and November
9ibid
4
Table 1: Percentage of Times a Month Gave Negative Returns
Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
% 44% 28% 72% 56% 50% 28%
Month Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
% 33% 33% 33% 67% 39% 22%
have the lowest (22% and 28%, respectively). But, one should be careful at
‘theorizing’ at the mere sight of such patterns. For example one can attribute
the low returns in October to advance tax-ﬁling or consumers adjusting their
cash ﬂows for the upcoming holiday season.
Similarly, March will coincide with the ﬁnancial year end. One can put
forward the tax-loss selling hypothesis, borrowing the idea from the US mar-
kets (In the US, ﬁnancial year coincides with the calender year. The observed
low returns during December and high returns during January is attributed
to tax-loss selling to reduce the tax-burden in December, which is followed
by a buy-back in January). But, unlike in US we don’t see buy back the
following month leading to an ‘April eﬀect’. It might be possible that they
are just ‘random’ occurrence, and might not show any recurring patterns.
It would be more insightful to examine the monthly performance across
‘structural breaks’. Sasidharan (2009) has shown that the Nifty series has had
four major structural breaks. The break periods were December 1994, July
1999, June 2003 and January 2006. And it was shown that the market has be-
come weak-form eﬃcient only since the third structural break corresponding
to June 2003. A ‘structural-break-wise’ analysis will provide a disaggregated
view of the time series, but at the same time provides enough aggregation
which an year-to-year analysis cannot provide. Besides, while markets behave
diﬀerently across diﬀerent regimes, there might be fair amount of consistency
in behaviour within the regimes. Table 2 show the monthly mean daily re-
turns accross structural breaks. The observations from the table 2 can be
summarised as follows:
Regime1, Jan‘91 to Dec‘94: The mean daily returns are highest for
February and January (above 0.6%), followed by August (0.45%). April,
May and October gave negative returns less than -0.2%
Regime2, Dec‘94 to Jul‘99: Average daily returns are more than 0.2%
during the months of December and February. It is lowest for November.
August, October and January also have negative returns
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Table 2: Monthly Mean Daily Returns Across Periods
Month Regime1 Regime2 Regime3 Regime4 Regime5
Jan 0.61 -0.11 0.11 -0.04 -0.25
Feb 0.68 0.24 0.17 0.04 -0.08
Mar 0.02 0.08 -0.42 -0.11 0.04
Apr -0.23 0.13 -0.24 -0.14 0.34
May -0.24 0.06 0.05 -0.23 -0.25
Jun 0.11 0.04 0.16 0.21 -0.25
Jul 0.29 -0.02 -0.16 0.26 0.19
Aug 0.50 -0.29 0.18 0.26 0.12
Sep 0.14 0.04 -0.35 0.30 0.10
Oct -0.25 -0.25 -0.11 0.04 -0.15
Nov 0.12 -0.35 0.38 0.40 0.07
Dec 0.11 0.27 0.12 0.42 0.17
Regime3, Jul‘99 to Jun‘03: Highest positive returns for November and
lowest returns for March, followed by September.
Regime4, Jun‘03 to Jan‘06: December and November have the highest
daily returns (above 0.4%). May has the lowest returns. April, March and
January also have negative returns
Regime5, Jan‘06 to Oct‘08: April registered the highest return and Jan-
uary, May and June has the lowest
Tables 3 and 4 summarizes the top performers and worst performers across
these regimes. We can see 7 out of 12 months appearing at diﬀerent points
of time as the worst performers! We neither see consistent January eﬀect nor
a tax-loss selling eﬀect. This reminds us of Mark Twain...
“October. This is one of the peculiarly dangerous months to spec-
ulate in stocks in. The others are July, January, September, April,
November, May, March, June, December, August and February” 10
The typical ‘monthly eﬀects’ that was documented in India was probably
the outcome of ﬁtting parametric estimators to a fat-tailed distribution. The
eﬀect of extreme values on any mean-based statistic is obvious...it gets pulled
towards the extreme observation. Regarding distributional properties, Sasid-
haran (2009) has shown that the return distribution for Nifty is not Gaussian,
10Mark Twain (1894) in The Tragedy of Pudd’nhead Wilson, ch 13
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Table 3: Month of the Year Eﬀect: The top Performers
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 Regime 4 Regime 5
February December November December April
January February August November July
August April June September December
Table 4: Month of the Year Eﬀect: The Worst Performers
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 Regime 4 Regime 5
October November March May Jan
May August September April May
April October April March June
rather it is closer to a Stable Paretain distribution with 훼 < 1. This class of
distribution is characterised by fat tails, and thus has the property of inﬁnite
population variance. Therefore, though estimators based on sample variance
is computable, they are not reliable. Under such circumstances it will be
preferable to use distribution-free tests.
2.1 Does Seasonality Persists?
If seasonality or month-of-the-year persists, by ranking the months according
to the size of their mean daily returns we might see similarity in these ranks
across years. But, instead of yearly ranks it would be better to examine
it across periods of structural breaks, as it can provide a fair amount of
aggregation and, at the same time, provide the essence of persisting patterns.
We, therefore, rank months according to their mean daily returns across the
ﬁve regimes. Then, we test whether these ranks are consistent across the
periods by examining rank correlation coeﬃcient between diﬀerent periods.
Table 5 provides the ranking of months based on the mean daily returns,
across the periods of structural breaks. January had ranks ranging from 2
to 11. February ranged from 1 to 8, starting with rank 1 and then slowly
departing from the top position to 2, 3, 7 and then 8 in the ﬁnal regime.
March also had suﬃcient variability ranging from 4 to 12. April had a nearly
alternating pattern with highest and lowest ranks ranging from 11 in regime-
four to 1 in regime-ﬁve. May and June’s ranks range from 5 to 12 and 4 to 12
respectively. We can also see that less ‘controversial’ months such as April
and July topping the list in the latest regime. August, which was ranked 11
in second regime, is now ranked 4. November had huge variability moving
from 12 in the second regime to rank 1 in the third regime. In the latest
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regime we can ﬁnd it at 6. October had a low variability at lower ranks -
9 to 12; and December had the low variability at higher ranks - 1 to 7. In
short, we do not see any consistent pattern across these months, and they
move around with great variability.
To test for consistency in the rankings we use Spearman’s rank correlation
coeﬃcient. The computations involved in getting the coeﬃcient between two
rankings are as follows: First rank the two series. Obtain 퐷, which is the
diﬀerence between two. Then the rank order correlation can be computed
by the equation:
휌 = 1− 6
∑
퐷2
푁(푁2 − 1) (2)
where, N equals the number of pairs and 휌 is the rank correlation coeﬃcient.
This exercise can be conducted for all pairs of rankings and the results can be
presented in a correlation matrix (see table 6). These results can be supple-
mented using Kendall’s coeﬃcient of concordance, which can simultaneously
measure the degree of relationship with all the sets of ranks. For this we
ﬁrst compute 퐷∗, is the diﬀerence of the sum of the ranks of reach row from
this mean. We take sum of ranks and divide it by the number of months to
get the average sum of ranks. 퐷∗ Next we can use the following formula to
compute the Kendall’s coeﬃcient of concordance, W:
푊 =
12
∑
퐷∗2
푚2(푁)(푁2 − 1) (3)
Where, m is the number of rankings, which is ﬁve in our case; N is the number
of cases ranked, which is 12 and W is the Kendall’s coeﬃcient of concordance.
A perfect agreement is indicated by a W=1 and a lack of agreement by a
W=0 (Downie and Heath, 1970).
The results from rank correlation coeﬃcients also conﬁrm our observa-
tions from exploratory data analysis that there are no persisting patterns in
monthly returns. On examining the results of Spearman’s rank correlation
coeﬃcients matrix in table 6, we ﬁnd neither high correlation coeﬃcients
nor statistical signiﬁcance. This result indicate a rejection of the presence of
seasonality persisting in the Indian markets. Our computation of Kendall’s
W
푊 =
12(1500)
(25)(12)(144− 1) = 0.42 (4)
also indicates that concordance between the rankings is low.
Sullivan et al points out that “In the limited sample sizes typically en-
countered in economic studies, systematic patterns and apparently signiﬁcant
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Table 5: Ranking of Months Based on Mean Daily Returns Across Periods
Month Regime1 Regime2 Regime3 Regime4 Regime5
Jan 2 9 6 9 11
Feb 1 2 3 7 8
Mar 9 4 12 10 7
Apr 10 3 10 11 1
May 11 5 7 12 10
Jun 8 6 4 6 12
Jul 4 8 9 5 2
Aug 3 11 2 4 4
Sep 5 7 11 3 5
Oct 12 10 8 8 9
Nov 6 12 1 2 6
Dec 7 1 5 1 3
relations are bound to occur if the data are analyzed with suﬃcient intensity”
(Sullivan et al., 1998). While pointing out to the dangers of data driven in-
ference in analysing calender eﬀects, they also cautions about data snooping
bias11. They reminds us that none of these calender eﬀects were preceded by
a theoretical model predicting their existence. It is not sure whether we have
over-indulged in data analysis, but we do suﬀer from data-snooping bias. At
this point, it will be preferable to stop short of theorizing further on the
possibilities of any ‘month-of-the-year’ eﬀect.
3 Conclusion
We see that seasonality is not a recurring phenomenon in the Indian mar-
kets. The earlier ﬁndings on seasonality could have been the outcome of
performing parametric estimates with long time series data, in which case
estimators can tend to get inﬂuenced by extreme values. As shown else-
where12, the distribution of returns need not be normally distributed, but
could be a Stable Paretian. This distribution is characterized by fatter tails
than predicted by normal distribution, implying that there have been a few
11“Like many of the social sciences, economics predominantly studies non-experimental
data and thus does not have the advantage of being able to test hypotheses independently
of the data that gave rise to them in the ﬁrst instance. If not accounted for, this practice,
referred to as data-snooping, can generate serious biases in statistical inference”(Sullivan
et al., 1998)
12Sasidharan (2009)
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Table 6: Spearman’ Rank Correlation Coeﬃcients for Monthly Ranking
Across Periodisation
Regime1 Regime2 Regime3 Regime4 Regime5
Regime1 1
Regime2 -0.13 1
(-0.68)
Regime3 0.41 -0.29 1
(-0.18) (-0.35)
Regime4 0.41 -0.23 0.44 1
(-0.17) (-0.47) (-0.15)
Regime5 0.08 0.14 -0.21 0.34 1
(0.79) (0.64) (0.49) (0.27)
very large changes that took place during much shorter sub-periods. This
would inﬂuence parametic estimates, and can mis-lead us to observing Jan-
uary Eﬀect or other such anomalies, when none actually exists. Investment
should be followed by the study of sound fundamentals, than based on naive
rules to earn easy (or, loose) money.
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